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INTRODUCTION 
Consumers in the United States are flocking to local food. The 
number of farmers’ markets around the country—many of which purport 
to sell only locally grown produce—has rapidly grown in recent years.1 
The allure of producers’ markets2 is easy to understand. Locavores3 
                                                 
*  B.A., Yale University (2003); J.D., Yale Law School (2007); Assistant Professor, 
Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks to Nicholas Lee, Courtney Turner, 
Rebecca Vermette, and the Regent Law Review staff for doing a terrific job organizing this 
symposium. 
1  LYDIA OBERHOLTZER & SHELLY GROW, PRODUCER-ONLY FARMERS’ MARKETS IN 
THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION: A SURVEY OF MARKET MANAGERS 2 (2003). 
2   Id. at 3 (noting that the term “producer-only” market is relatively recent and 
defining it as meaning that vendors “produce the goods that they sell directly to retail 
customers”). 
3  A locavore is defined as “a person whose diet consists only or principally of locally 
grown or produced food.” NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1025 (Angus Stevenson & 
Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010); see also Stephanie Tai, The Rise of U.S. Food 
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prefer small farms to massive, distant agribusiness for freshness, 
environmental, social, and safety-based reasons, and they assume, when 
so assured by the market, that the food at the market is in fact local. 
Beyond the health and safety benefits that some consumers believe flow 
from knowledge of food production practices,4 buyers enjoy the quality 
and taste of just-picked produce,5 and they derive substantial utility 
from the knowledge that they have supported local agriculture.6 Many 
also believe that fresh, local produce is healthier and less 
environmentally damaging.7 Producers are equally pleased by the trend 
toward local food and farmers’ markets—local food often sells at a 
premium,8 and direct sales to consumers reduce packaging and 
marketing costs,9 an important consideration for small producers. 
                                                                                                                  
Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1074–1080 (2012) (describing the 
“modern sustainable food movement”). 
4  Shermain D. Hardesty, Role of Direct Marketing in California, 10 AGRIC. & 
RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 5 (noting consumers’ “sense of food safety” 
associated with local produce comes from their familiarity with the source); see also RICH 
PIROG & ANDY LARSON, CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF THE SAFETY, HEALTH, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VARIOUS SCALES AND GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN OF FOOD SUPPLY 
CHAINS 2, 10 (2007) (concluding, from a survey that produced 500 usable responses, that 
“[e]ighty-five percent indicated that local produce was ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ safe, with 74 
percent indicating they perceived the national food supply chain to be safe.”). 
5  KIM DARBY ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LOCALLY PRODUCED FOODS: A 
CUSTOMER INTERCEPT STUDY OF DIRECT MARKET AND GROCERY STORE SHOPPERS 6, 10 
(2006) (finding, based on a survey of 530 consumers, that “[f]reshness was the most 
frequently cited” reason for buying local produce and that “[t]aste also ranked high”); 
Kynda R. Curtis, Are All Direct Market Consumers Created Equal?, 42 J. FOOD 
DISTRIBUTION RES. 26, 28, (2011), (showing “taste” as the most important produce attribute 
cited by community supported agriculture (“CSA”) and farmers’ market customers); 
Hardesty, supra note 4, at 5 (“Consumers have reported that quality is the number one 
reason they shop at farmers’ markets; they are attracted by the fresh-picked, and vine- and 
tree-ripened produce.”). 
6  Kim Darby et al., Decomposing Local: A Conjoint Analysis of Locally Produced 
Foods, 90 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 476, 485 (2008). 
7  See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 5, at 26–28, 31 (noting that although both farmers’ 
market and CSA customers “rated product taste as the most important attribute” they 
sought in produce, CSA customers also cared about whether the produce was “organic,” 
high “quality,” and “local”—more so than farmers’ market customers). 
8  See, e.g., DARBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (concluding that “consumers are 
willing to pay more for locally produced foods”); see also OBERHOLTZER & GROW, supra note 
1, at 2 (citing TIM PAYNE, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., U.S. FARMERS MARKETS—2000: A STUDY 
OF EMERGING TRENDS, at iv (2002) (describing broad economic benefits to farmers, and 
noting that, in 2000, more than 19,000 farmers “exclusively” sold their produce at farmers’ 
markets)). But see JAKE CLARO, VERMONT FARMERS’ MARKETS AND GROCERY STORES: A 
PRICE COMPARISON 23 (2011) (finding that “prices at farmers’ markets are in many cases 
competitive with prices at grocery stores”); RICH PIROG & NICK MCCANN, IS LOCAL FOOD 
MORE EXPENSIVE? A CONSUMER PRICE PERSPECTIVE ON LOCAL AND NON-LOCAL FOODS 
PURCHASED IN IOWA 7–11 (2009) (comparing local and non-local prices for zucchini, 
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Consumer demand for localism, with the price premiums that 
follow, creates an incentive for fraud—passing off non-locally-produced 
food as farm-raised.10 It is difficult for both consumers and market 
managers to distinguish between a carrot grown at the farm down the 
road and a carrot plucked from the shelves of a chain grocery store and 
resold on market day.11 The threat of farmers’ market fraud is not 
merely theoretical. Investigations by a news station in California 
uncovered numerous incidents of farmers selling produce that they had 
not grown.12 Market managers around the country have similarly found 
farmers selling purportedly local food out of season13 and, when visiting 
farms, have observed piles of dirt rather than crops.14 Although the 
extent of the fraud is not currently known—and the great majority of 
sellers are very likely honest—the number and variety of incidents so far 
suggests that it could be fairly widespread. Farmers’ markets will likely 
continue to grow,15 and as demand for local produce increases,16 the 
                                                                                                                  
summer squash, cucumbers, string beans, cabbage, sweet onions, tomatoes, corn, eggs, and 
certain meats and noting that in terms of statistical significance only string beans were 
more expensive at farmers’ markets). 
9  See, e.g., Nina W. Tarr, Food Entrepreneurs and Food Safety Regulation, 7 J. 
FOOD L. & POL’Y 35, 36, 46–47 (2011) (noting that if a “farmer had bagged . . . lettuce before 
taking it to market, she would have engaged in ‘processing’ ” and would have been “subject 
to more regulation,” but also noting that even farmers who sell raw produce at markets 
already must comply with a variety of safety-related regulations, although this varies by 
state). 
10  For examples, see infra Part II. 
11  As shown by recent scandals relating to mislabeled fish and olive oil, this 
problem is not confined to farmers’ markets. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Survey Finds That 
Fish Are Often Not What Label Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/us/survey-finds-that-fish-are-often-not-what-label-
says.html?_r=0; Elizabeth Weise, Study: Imported Extra Virgin Olive Oil Often Mislabeled, 
USA TODAY, (July 16, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
industries/food/2010-07-15-Oliveoil15_ST_N.htm?csp=34. 
12  Joel Grover & Matt Goldberg, False Claims, Lies Caught on Tape at Farmers 
Markets, NBC L.A. (Sept. 23, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/
Hidden-Camera-Investigation-Farmers-Markets-103577594.html. 
13  See infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
14  See infra text accompanying note 58. 
15  In addition to the benefits to consumers, producers, and communities, the Food 
Safety Modernization Act also might encourage more direct sales to consumers as, under 
the Act, farmers are exempt from certain stricter food safety standards if they can show 
that during a three-year period they had a higher “average annual monetary value of the 
food . . . sold directly to qualified end-users” than the average annual monetary value of all 
“food manufactured, processed, packed, or held” at the facility and “the average annual 
monetary value of all food sold by such facility” during the three-year period was less than 
$500,000. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, sec. 103, § 418(l)(1)(C)(ii), Pub. L. No. 111-
353, 124 Stat. 3892 (2011) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 350g(l)(1)(C)(ii) (2012)) 
(emphasis added). 
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problem may become more acute. If so, it could undermine legitimate 
local food sellers through direct competition as well as by threatening 
consumer confidence in producer-only markets as a whole.17 
Public and private responses to the problem vary. Current market 
and government anti-fraud efforts range from the non-existent to the 
highly involved, but even careful attempts to ensure the produce is truly 
local sometimes fail. Farm visits, a measure commonly included in 
market rules,18 can only verify produce that is growing at the time of the 
visit, and in some cases not even that—produce stored on site and 
observed by the market manager was not necessarily produced on site.19 
Programs that rely on farmer self-certification, including descriptions 
and maps of crops, can be gamed, particularly in larger markets where 
peer monitoring is less likely to be effective. And although state 
regulatory or criminal penalties can be significant, the few states that 
have attempted to implement a relatively comprehensive anti-fraud 
regulatory regime at markets lack the resources to fairly and 
consistently enforce these rules.20 
To ensure that consumers get what they think they are buying, and 
to protect honest producers’ businesses, more effective efforts to curb 
farmers’ market fraud may be necessary, at least in some areas. But if 
enough consumers can distinguish genuine from fraudulent local food, 
and there is sufficient competition among local food outlets, markets 
may have the necessary incentives to police themselves. Any proposed 
solution must be sensitive to the need to minimize costs to market 
participants (in dollars, time, and effort) to ensure that farmers’ markets 
remain attractive to consumers and producers, as well as to the many 
competing demands on police and regulatory agencies. This Article 
identifies the problem of farmers’ market fraud, explores existing efforts 
to prevent it, and makes some tentative suggestions as to how markets 
and governments can better address the problem. 
                                                                                                                  
16  LINDSAY DAY-FARNSWORTH ET AL., SCALING UP: MEETING THE DEMAND FOR 
LOCAL FOOD, at i (2009). 
17  See NEIL D. HAMILTON, NAT’L. CTR. FOR AGRIC. LAW RESEARCH & INFO., 
FARMERS’ MARKETS: RULES, REGULATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 28 (2002), available at 
http://www.nyfarmersmarket.com/pdf_files/fmruleregs.pdf (“There is widespread 
agreement among public officials, market advocates, and farmers that allowing other 
products to be sold can be detrimental to both the value of the market for farmers and to 
the quality of the market experience for shoppers. . . . The sale of produce by those who did 
not raise it defeats the idea of a ‘farmers’ market, is deceptive for consumers who may not 
realize the distinction, and creates unfair competition for local farmers at the market.”). 
18  See, e.g. infra Part III.A.2. 
19  See infra text accompanying note 104. 
20  See infra notes 59, 127 and accompanying text. 
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Part I describes the rise of the local food movement and why direct 
sales to consumers through farmers’ markets are so popular with both 
farmers and consumers. Part II, however, shows that some consumers 
might not be getting the produce they believe they are purchasing and 
how seller fraud can damage honest farmers’ businesses by both 
undercutting them in the short term and potentially eroding consumer 
trust in the long term. Part III of this Article explores solutions, 
including market and seller agreements, regulatory approaches, and 
criminal penalties. It concludes that where consumers are able to 
differentiate between locally-grown and distant produce and where there 
is healthy competition among markets in a region, markets will likely be 
adequately incentivized to police themselves by heightening rules and 
enforcement. For markets that lack these competitive incentives, 
however, state regulations implemented by market boards and managers 
(taking advantage of their local knowledge) would likely be an attractive 
approach. With more attention to the potential for fraud, markets and 
governments can better protect both consumers and farmers. 
I. THE VALUE OF LOCAL FOOD 
Farmers’ markets are increasingly popular, rising from 1,755 
markets operating in 1994 to 8,144 in 2013.21 Consumers demand local 
food to fulfill various environmental and social values22—or simply to 
find better-tasting produce23—and farmers benefit from opportunities for 
high-priced sales to loyal buyers.24 There is no widely-accepted definition 
of “local,”25 but this Article addresses the type of local food that 
consumers think they are buying at producer-only farmers’ markets: 
produce that was grown at a farm somewhere nearby.26 These producer-
                                                 
21  Agric. Mktg. Serv., National Count of Farmers Market Directory Listing Graph: 
1994–2013, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplate
Data.do?template=TemplateS&leftNav=WholesaleandFarmersMarkets&page=WFM
FarmersMarketGrowth&description=Farmers%20Market%20Growth (last modified Aug. 
8, 2013). 
22  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
23  See Curtis, supra note 5, at 28. 
24  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
25  STEVE MARTINEZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS: CONCEPTS 
IMPACTS AND ISSUES, at iii (2010) (observing that “[t]hough ‘local’ has a geographic 
connotation, there is no consensus on a definition in terms of the distance between 
production and consumption,” and noting that the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act defines “locally and regionally produced” food as food that is transported “less than 400 
miles from its origin or within the state in which it is produced”); Megan Galey & A. Bryan 
Endres, Locating the Boundaries of Sustainable Agriculture, 17 NEXUS: CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 
3, 5 (2012) (noting different definitions used by states, “grocery stores, restaurants, and 
farmers’ markets” and in the Farm Bill). 
26  See supra note 2 for a definition of producer-only farmers’ markets. 
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only markets are popular, comprising more than 60% of all farmers’ 
markets.27 The sources of their popularity are explored briefly below. 
A. Consumers 
A diverse, incompletely overlapping set of consumer values drives 
the steadily growing demand for local food. Alice Waters, Michael Pollan, 
and other leaders of the U.S. slow food movement believe that “cooking 
should be based on the finest and freshest seasonal ingredients that are 
produced sustainably and locally”28 and view the movement as 
embodying a “set of cultural practices” and “even a way of life.”29 These 
connoisseurs of local produce tie together taste and social values, 
demanding delicious produce and a “food economy that is ‘good, clean, 
and fair,’ ”30 and, increasingly, consumers share some or all of these 
values. Buyers looking for freshness and flavor are drawn to producer-
only markets for obvious reasons. Consumers seeking fairness in food 
derive substantial utility from the knowledge that they are supporting a 
local farmer, whom they may know,31 rather than a large, faceless 
agribusiness. Agribusiness nearly always wins out in the national 
market for food, with its economies of scale and government subsidies, 
but some consumers of local food hope to tilt the scales in favor of the 
family farmer. 
The values of “clean” and “fair food” also connote environmental 
concerns. Large factory farms send massive quantities of pollution into 
interstate rivers,32 and many consumers view family farms—particularly 
                                                 
27  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL FARMERS MARKET MANAGER SURVEY 2006, at 20 
(2009) (showing that 60.1 percent markets involve direct retail sales only). It is not clear 
that all retail sales involve sales directly from the producer, but the same report indicates 
that on average nationwide, more than 70% of vendors “reported to be producers selling 
goods they had grown and/or produced themselves.” Id. at 51. 
28  Stella Lucia Volpe, The Slow Food Movement, ACSM’S HEALTH & FITNESS J., 
May–June 2012, at 29, 29; CHEZ PANISSE RESTAURANT, http://www.chezpanisse.com/about/
alice-waters (last visited Mar. 17, 2014). 
29  Michael Pollan, Cruising on the Ark of Taste, MOTHER JONES, May–June 2003, at 
75, 76. 
30  CHEZ PANISSE RESTAURANT, supra note 28. 
31  DARBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6, 10 (concluding from a survey of 530 respondents 
that, after freshness, “[s]upporting local businesses was the next most frequently cited 
reason” for purchasing local produce); Curtis, supra note 5, at 30 (noting the “high 
importance” that CSA members, in particular, place on “supporting local farmers”). 
32  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 2000 REPORT, 
at ES-3, 65, 74, 80, 82, 96, 140 (2002) (noting that states reported that agricultural 
nonpoint source (“NPS”) pollution was the leading source of water quality impairment and 
that the use of animal feeding operations, pesticides, irrigation water and fertilizer, among 
other activities, can cause this pollution). 
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those they can visit and thus experience first-hand—as more benign.33 
Some vendors at farmers’ markets also offer organic or “pesticide-free” 
produce,34 which can reduce harmful pollution and potentially provide 
health benefits to consumers.35 Locavores further point to the shorter 
transport distances required for local produce,36 although some studies 
suggest that local agriculture does not have a smaller carbon footprint 
than its centralized counterpart.37 Beyond pollution, some local food 
enthusiasts prefer the non-genetically modified “heirloom” produce that 
some small farms offer, favoring plant diversity and traditional 
agriculture over the engineered monocultures that tend to dominate 
large farms and their perceived health and environmental risks.38 
Finally, meat consumers prefer free-range chicken and pasture-fed beef 
not only for taste but also to avoid supporting inhumane conditions on 
factory farms.39 And as introduced above, consumers of local food like 
knowing where their food came from and how it was grown for safety 
reasons.40 In a world of e-coli scares and growing distrust of the 
government’s ability to protect the food supply, local food plucked fresh 
from the fields seems safer and more predictable. 
                                                 
33  See, e.g., PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that consumers in one 
survey placed “high importance” on “pesticide use on fresh produce they purchase”). 
34  Cf. Organic Market Overview, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/
natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-overview.
aspx#.UuPeTfQo6c9 (last updated June 19, 2012) (noting that “7 percent of U.S. organic 
food sales occur through farmers’ markets, foodservice, and marketing channels other than 
retail stores”). 
35  PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that a majority of survey 
respondents perceived organic and locally-grown food to be healthier than conventionally 
sourced food, and noting that although there are few studies linking organics to better 
health, such studies are growing in number). But cf. Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., Are 
Organic Foods Safer or Healthier than Conventional Alternatives?, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 348, 359 (2012) (finding few health benefits from eating organic in lieu of 
conventional produce). 
36  See PIROG & LARSON, supra note 4, at 2, 7 (noting, based on a survey with 500 
usable responses, that 50% responded that the “distance traveled” (by the produce) was 
“ ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ important,” although higher percentages of respondents cared about 
“pesticide use,” “date harvested,” and “food safety inspection”). 
37  Christopher L. Weber & H. Scott Matthews, Food-Miles and the Relative Climate 
Impacts of Food Choices in the United States, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3508, 3508 (2008). 
38  See, e.g., Pollan, supra note 29, at 75 (noting that members of the local food 
movement “aimed to save endangered domestic plants and animals”). 
39  Cf. Kelli Boylen, Marketing Animal Welfare with Certification, HAY & FORAGE 
GROWER (Aug. 10, 2012), http://hayandforage.com/beef/marketing-animal-welfare-
certification (describing increasingly popular “Animal Welfare Approved” (“AWA”) 
certification and an AWA-certified farmer who sells grass-fed beef at a farmers’ market); 
Standards, ANIMAL WELFARE APPROVED, http://animalwelfareapproved.org/standards (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2014) (describing standards for the humane treatment of farm animals). 
40  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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B. Farmers and Communities 
Small farmers have responded enthusiastically to the steadily rising 
demand for local foods. Some accommodate consumers’ desire for a 
connection with their food source by posting pictures of their goats and 
cows at their sales booths and offering farm tours. They pile oddly-
shaped heirloom tomatoes and purple carrots into baskets, offer free 
samples to highlight the flavor of freshly-picked produce, and suggest 
recipes for experimenting with new seasonal vegetables that consumers 
might not have previously encountered. And in exchange, they collect a 
healthy price for their wares. Farmers are often able to set prices that 
are comparable to, if not higher than,41 those found in grocery stores 
while avoiding shipping costs and more stringent labeling and packaging 
requirements.42 Cutting out the middleman can also generate 
substantial savings—farmers in California, for example, make “less than 
20 cents on the consumer’s full dollar” when selling through 
wholesalers.43 Studies of farmer revenues from farmers’ markets show 
average annual sales per farmer ranging from $7,000 to more than 
$11,000 annually,44 and that a substantial percentage of farmers at 
markets rely solely on these venues for produce sales.45 
Farmers’ markets also benefit communities—creating direct 
economic impacts and sometimes pulling shoppers to downtown areas 
and causing spending beyond the food sector. In terms of direct impact, 
the City of Portland, Oregon, for example, estimates that “[i]n 2007, the 
14 farmers’ markets in Portland sold goods totaling an estimated 
aggregate of nearly $11.2 million,”46 which created “just under 100 direct 
jobs,” “over $1.3 million in employee compensation,” and “induced” 
contributions—such as “personal spending done by the farmer . . . or her 
market worker”—of more than $1.8 million.47 More broadly, farmers’ 
                                                 
41  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
42  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
43  See Hardesty, supra note 4, at 5.  
44  Cheryl Brown & Stacy Miller, The Impacts of Local Markets: A Review of 
Research on Farmers Markets and Community Supported Agriculture (CSA), 90 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 1296, 1297 (2008). Some states had lower sales, though. In Iowa, only 30% of 
market vendors had “annual sales greater than $5,000.” Id. (citing Theresa Varner & 
Daniel Otto, Factors Affecting Sales at Farmers’ Markets: An Iowa Study, 30 REV. AGRIC. 
ECON. 176, 185 (2008)). 
45  Id. (showing that in 2006, 25% of vendors relied on farmers’ market sales for 
their “sole source of farm income”). 
46  Memorandum from Bonnie Gee Yosick to Clark Worth (Sept. 23, 2008), available 
at http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/236588. 
47  Id. 
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markets can drive economic and social interactions that “create the basis 
for the emergence of new local food systems.”48 
II. THE THREAT OF FRAUD 
In light of the growth of farmers’ markets, and the opportunity to 
resell certain mass-produced produce at a premium49 without dealing 
with labeling, packaging and middlemen,50 there are reasonably strong 
incentives for farmers’ market fraud. And fraud detection is difficult: A 
local carrot may be nearly identical to a “foreign” carrot. Fraud harms 
both consumers, who do not get what they pay for, and honest farmers, 
who are undercut by more cheaply-produced produce masquerading as 
local.51 As one Wisconsin farmer complained with respect to resellers, 
“ ‘We sell four cucumbers for $1 and they sell eight for $1.’ ”52 
Equally troublingly, an erosion of consumer trust in farmers’ claims 
that they grew the food they sell could damage the entire enterprise, 
harming both consumers and farmers. Although there appear to have 
been no empirical studies of the extent or degree of fraud, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it is a common concern among market organizers 
and, in some cases, governments and consumers. 
In California, where the state has certified certain markets as local 
since 197753 and boasts the largest number of farmers’ markets in the 
country,54 there have been numerous recent allegations of fraud. A Los 
Angeles television station conducted an undercover investigation in 2010 
and found one seller “loading up his truck, with boxes of produce from 
big commercial farms as far away as Mexico.”55 The seller indicated that 
“everything” he sold at the farmers’ market came from his field, but 
when the NBC crew investigated his farm, he could not show the 
investigators “most of the produce he was selling, such as celery, garlic, 
and avocados.”56 When asked about the lack of avocados on his property, 
                                                 
48  Brown & Miller, supra note 44, at 1300. 
49  See supra note 8. 
50  See supra note 9. 
51  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
52  Lauren Etter, Food for Thought: Do You Need Farmers for a Farmers Market?, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at A1. 
53  See Certified Farmers Market Program, CAL. DEP’T FOOD & AGRIC., 
http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/i_&_c/cfm.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
54  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Celebrates National Farmers Market 
Week, August 4–10 (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
usdamediafb?contentid=2013/08/0155.xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true (showing 
759 markets in California, followed by 637 in New York and 336 in Illinois). 
55  Grover & Goldberg, supra note 12. 
56  Id. 
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the seller responded, “That I’ll be honest. That stuff came from 
somewhere else.”57 In other field visits, the journalists “found farms full 
of weeds, or dry dirt, instead of rows of the vegetables that were being 
sold at the markets.”58 The investigation stoked enough concern among 
farmers, market managers, and consumers to cause the state’s Farmers’ 
Market Advisory Committee to propose a new enforcement program with 
higher fees and closer enforcement.59 An attorney for the California 
Federation of Certified Farmers’ Markets suggested that there was “a 
growing trend of misrepresentations in all forms . . . of agricultural 
product marketing.”60 From August 2012 through August 2013, the state 
issued nine suspensions, revocations, or fines to sellers for “selling 
product not of [their] own production,”61 and sixty-six notices of 
noncompliance to sellers selling products not listed on their state 
producer certifications.62 
In a separate California investigation in 2012, San Diego County’s 
Department of Agriculture, Weights, and Measures, through undercover 
agents, found one seller who “wasn’t even growing the broccoli or 
Brussels sprouts he was selling.”63 The seller later “pleaded guilty to a 
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500 
[false/misleading advertising].”64 
Anecdotal evidence of fraud is not limited to California. According to 
a state newspaper, the manager of the Coventry Regional Farmers 
Market in Connecticut notes that “constant rumbling” about fraud is a 
                                                 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Kate Campbell, Farmers Market Enforcement Fees Could Increase, AG ALERT 
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.agalert.com/story/?id=1889 (noting that “interest was 
heightened” following Southern California media reports of conventional produce being 
sold at farmers’ markets). 
60  Id. 
61  CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CERTIFIED FARMERS MKT. PROGRAM, REVOKED, 
SUSPENDED, AND/OR FINED LIST (2013), available at www.cdfa.ca.gov/is/pdfs/CPC_
Suspension_2013_2nd_quarter.pdf. 
62  CAL. DEP’T OF FOOD & AGRIC., CERTIFIED FARMERS MKT. PROGRAM, CFM NON-
COMPLIANCE WORKSHEET JANUARY–DECEMBER 2013, available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/
is/pdfs/CFM_Noncompliance_List.pdf. 
63  Clare Leschin-Hoar, When Fraud Hits the Farmers Market, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO, 
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://voiceofsandiego.org/2013/04/09/when-fraud-hits-the-farmers-market/. 
64  Letter from Kathryn Lange Turner, Deputy City Attorney, Office of the City 
Attorney, City of San Diego, to Mark Lyles, Inspector, Dep’t of Agric., Weights & Measures 
(Mar. 13, 2013) (alteration in original), available at http://voiceofsandiego.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/51644b41b3233.pdf.pdf. 
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“huge concern,”65 and at least one seller in Shelton “had strawberries, an 
early crop, in late summer.”66 In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a seller had out 
of season zucchinis with “wax on them”—a tip-off that the zucchinis had 
not been plucked fresh from the field.67 And in Michigan, a well-known, 
local organic farmer was accused of buying produce from wholesalers.68 
Furthermore, a Virginia study found that “[s]ome farmers seem to be 
buying a great volume of the produce they sell,”69 and an organization in 
Pennsylvania believes that resellers of produce “capture over 90 percent” 
of the value of Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program vouchers, through 
which certain individuals can use government-issued checks to purchase 
produce at farmers’ markets.70 The problem does not appear to be limited 
to the United States—in the United Kingdom, market managers 
observed: “The markets are only supposed to stock ‘local produce,’ but 
last week we discovered spinach from Portugal and Spain—produced by 
another supermarket supplier—being sold at a farmers market . . . even 
legitimate stallholders are ‘topping up’ their locally grown produce with 
vegetables bought from Britain’s wholesale markets.”71 
It is difficult to assess the scope of the fraud problem. Much fraud 
may be undetected, and much detected fraud may be unreported. 
Nonetheless, market managers and sellers worry that even a few 
incidents can have potentially large impacts on markets. In one West 
Virginia survey with 102 vendor respondents, when asked about the 
“largest obstacles to their success,” 20 vendors “indicated an obstacle 
with vendors who sold products they did not produce themselves, many 
of them charging lower prices making it difficult to compete.”72 And, 
                                                 
65  Jan Ellen Spiegel, Fraud Happens at Connecticut’s Farmers’ Markets—but Not 
Often, CT. MIRROR (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.ctmirror.org/fraud-happens-connecticuts-
farmers-markets-not-often/. 
66  Id. 
67  Etter, supra note 52. 
68  Kimberley Willis, Fraud at the Farmers Market, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/fraud-at-the-farmers-market. 
69  VA. DEP’T FOR THE AGING, SENIOR FARMERS’ MARKET NUTRITION PROGRAM 4 
(2012). 
70  SHELLY GROW & LYDIA OBERHOLTZER, THE USE OF FARMERS’ MARKET NUTRITION 
PROGRAMS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC 6 (2003). 
71  Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas & Claire Newell, Focus: Farmers’ Markets Sell 
‘Supermarket’ Foods, SUNDAY TIMES (Apr. 8, 2007), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/
news/uk_news/article62830.ece. 
72  Stacy Miller et al., Educational Needs and Perceived Obstacles Identified by 
Farmers’ Markets in West Virginia, in 2006 NORTH CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION 
RESEARCH CONFERENCE 122, 130 (Neil A. Knobloch ed. 2006), available at 
http://aged.caf.wvu.edu/Research/AAAE-NC-2006/2006%20North%20Central%20
Research%20Conference%20Proceedings.pdf#page=131. 
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:367 378 
although they believe that the fraud is not widespread,73 Connecticut 
farmers worry that “ ‘[y]ou’re one news story away from ruining it for 
everyone’ ”74 by eroding consumer trust. Indeed, fear of losing customers 
may have driven at least one farmers’ market to try to cover up fraud 
allegations: A market manager who worked for an organization that ran 
18 Southern California markets alleged that the organization 
discouraged her from reporting fraud “violations to authorities” and 
“retaliated against her after she did so anyway.”75 This demonstrates 
that although competition among markets to attract locavores will often 
inspire careful monitoring of producer-only claims, it could also lead to a 
damaging tendency to cheat on a market level. 
III. PREVENTING FRAUD 
To combat the threat of fraud, markets, local governments, and 
states have experimented with a variety of approaches, including 
contractual, regulatory, and criminal solutions. This Part explores these 
approaches to fraud and suggests that where consumers can adequately 
differentiate local and non-local produce and there is market competition 
in the area, markets will be adequately incentivized to enhance and 
enforce producer-only rules. Conversely, where these conditions are not 
present, a hybrid model in which a state-mandated enforcement regime 
is carried out by local market managers may be a cost-effective solution. 
This will be particularly important for larger markets, which cannot 
simply rely on norms and vendor monitoring to address fraud concerns.76 
A. Contractual Approaches 
Market managers and farmers’ market boards—and the participant 
sellers—are closest to the problem, and many markets already attempt 
to regulate fraud through various provisions in market rules and seller 
agreements. Indeed, producer-only markets that fear losing discerning 
customers to other competing markets will be highly incentivized to 
expand these protections. The most common approaches include 
                                                 
73  See Spiegel, supra note 65. 
74  Id. 
75  David Karp, Market Watch: Farmers Market Cheating Alleged, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/10/food/la-fo-marketwatch-20101105. 
76  See, e.g., GARRY STEPHENSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE LINK BETWEEN 
FARMERS’ MARKET SIZE AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 13 (2007), available at 
http://smallfarms.oregonstate.edu/sites/default/files/small-farms-tech-report/eesc_1082-
e.pdf (quoting one market manager: “You can’t be everywhere and you don’t know what’s 
happening at that other end of the market now. . . . When it’s a smaller market you have a 
much closer relationship. And so vendor problems are part of it; you have more vendor 
problems with a large market.”). 
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requiring producer commitments to sell only producer-grown produce, 
mandating submission of lists of products to be sold throughout the 
upcoming market season, and conducting farm inspections to verify 
production, backed by sanctions including expulsion. A 2002 survey of 
market managers at Mid-Atlantic producer-only markets found that 
“[t]hirty-seven percent of managers used an application or contract that 
spells out the producer-only rule,” with two of these managers requiring 
plans describing what producers will sell.77 Forty-seven percent of 
respondents indicated “that they do farm inspections, either personally 
or by committee,” although not always regularly.78 
1. Matching Crop Lists and Acreages with Products Sold 
Market agreements between market managers and sellers often 
require sellers to provide, before the selling season, lists of the crops that 
they will sell or acreages of crops and, in some cases, how much of which 
crop they will sell.79 Actual sales must then match these lists.80 
Descriptions of acreages indicate the amount of food that farmers can 
realistically sell; if a farmer with a half-acre comes to market with 500 
watermelons, market managers will likely be suspicious. Based on the 
author’s non-scientific survey of market rules, requirements for crop lists 
and acreages are common among producer-only markets. Washington, 
DC’s FRESHFARM Markets provide, for example, 
Only items listed in your completed application can be sold at the 
FRESHFARM Markets. You must list all food and products that you 
plan to bring to market. Items not listed will be allowed for sale only 
with advance approval by the FRESHFARM Markets’ management. 
If you want to bring additional or new products to market that are 
not on your original market application, you must let market 
management know in writing what those products are and get prior 
approval from market management before bringing these products to 
market.81 
                                                 
77  OBERHOLTZER & GROW, supra note 1, at 15. 
78  Id.; see also HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 28 (noting that “[t]o accomplish the 
‘producer only’ goal, markets typically have rules defining what can and cannot be sold at 
the market and creating extensive processes for determining the eligibility of products and 
producers to participate in the market” and providing examples of market rules). 
79  See, e.g., Market Agreement, Urban Harvest, Inc., Urban Harvest Farmers 
Market Vendor Application, available at http://urbanharvest.org/documents/118591/
226131/market+vendor+application.pdf/. 
80  See, e.g., id. 
81  Market Rules, FRESHFARM Markets., FRESHFARM Markets Rules and 
Procedures 13 (2013–2014) [hereinafter FRESHFARM Market Rules], available at 
http://www.freshfarmmarket.org/pdfs/2013_rules_and_regulations.pdf. 
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The City of Chicago, which prohibits vendors from selling “products 
from another farm without full transparency,” asks vendors to “list all 
sites including a map” for each farm or orchard site, showing “farm 
boundaries, growing areas, crop locations, and storage sheds, 
packing/processing facility locations,” as well as the number of acres on 
the farm and acres in production.82 
The Putnam Farmers’ Market in West Virginia similarly requires 
that producers only sell food they have produced, although they may 
resell other local farmers’ food under a “provisional arrangement.”83 
Putnam also requires vendors to submit a “product plan with their 
application,”84 which must list the products they grow,85 just as the 
Brownsville, Texas market, which requires that “[a]ll vendors’ farms or 
production areas must be located within the state of Texas,”86 mandates 
that vendors “list all items that you would like to sell” and, if they sell 
shrimp, to show that they “own the boats that caught the shrimp.”87 
The Hernando, Mississippi Farmers Market indicates that its 
market managers “believe strongly in the origin of a product and 
promote our market as a place where customers can buy LOCAL 
products.”88 The vendor application also asks the seller: “Do you grow all 
your produce and/or raise all your animals . . . ?” and indicates that if the 
seller “anticipate[s] purchasing any crops/product from, or selling for, a 
local farmer,” she must have a certificate for these crops.89 Sellers at the 
                                                 
82  Market Agreement, City of Chicago, City of Chicago Farmers Markets 
Application 2013 (Nov. 2012) (on file with the Regent University Law Review). 
83  Market Rules, Putnam Farmers’ Market, Market Rules of the Putnam Farmers’ 
Market 2012, at 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter Putnam Market Rules], available at 
http://putnamfarmersmarket.weebly.com/uploads/6/9/6/4/6964545/market_rules_of_the_
putnam_farmers.pdf. 
84  Id. at 2. 
85  Market Application, Putnam Farmers’ Market, 2014 Vendor Application of 
Interest (2014), available at http://putnamfarmersmarket.weebly.com/uploads/6/9/6/4/
6964545/vendor_application_2014.pdf (requiring the applicant to indicate which items they 
are interested in selling). 
86  Market Agreement, Brownsville Farmers’ Market, Brownsville Farmers’ Market 
Vendor Contract (2009–2010), available at http://www.brownsvillefarmersmarket.com.
php5-13.dfw1-1.websitetestlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Vendor_Contract_2009-
2010-Season.pdf. 
87  Market Application, Brownsville Farmers’ Market, Produce Vendor Application 
Form, available at http://www.brownsvillefarmersmarket.com.php5-13.dfw1-1.websitetest
link.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Produce-Vendor-Application-Form.pdf. 
88  Market Application, Hernando Farmers Market, Hernando Farmers Market 2013 
Vendor Application (2013) [hereinafter Hernando Market Application], available at 
http://cityofhernando.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2013-Hernando-Farmers-Market-
application-packet.pdf. 
89  Id. 
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Hernando market must submit an Affidavit/Grower Certificate that 
describes the total acreage of the farm and the acreage of “fruits, 
vegetables, or flowers for sale” as well as a list of all of the produce the 
farmer “intend[s] to sell” during the year.90 
Not all markets are so stringent, however. In Walpole, New 
Hampshire, market guidelines provide that “[g]rowers may sell only 
what they grow or raise on their own farms,” and “[e]ach vendor must 
agree, in writing, to comply with the letter and spirit of these 
guidelines,” with “fraudulent or dishonest practices” prohibited.91 
Vendors also must list “what [they]’d like to sell” and the location of 
their land, but crop lists and acreages are not required.92 Other markets 
similarly do not request specific produce lists but demand certification, 
in writing, that sellers will grow the produce they propose to sell. The 
City of Parkersburg, West Virginia Downtown Farmers’ Marketplace 
rules and regulations provide that “[a]ll products for sale at the 
Marketplace must be produced by the vendor”93 and require vendor 
applicants to verify that they are “the actual producers of the specifi[c] 
items which they intend to sell.”94 
Even for markets that require a list of produce to be sold or acreage 
of the crops that will produce vegetables and fruits to be sold, or a 
written certification showing that produce is local, it is not clear how 
carefully or how often market managers compare lists and acreages with 
the types and quantities of produce sold. And even with careful checking, 
quantities are very difficult to verify; if a grower has indicated a 
particular acreage or listed a particular type and amount of produce she 
will sell, the amount actually sold at market weekly can only be roughly 
compared with the amount of produce the farmer claimed she would 
produce. Verifying whether produce is locally grown is also difficult from 
a seasonal perspective—although a farmer might list strawberries as a 
type of fruit to be sold at market, managers should be suspect if a farmer 
in New England sells strawberries, an early summer crop, in August. 
Within market rules and vendor agreements many market managers 
                                                 
90  Id. 
91  Market Rules, Walpole Farmers Market, Walpole Farmers Market Guidelines 5–
6 (2013) [hereinafter Walpole Market Rules], available at http://walpolenhfarmersmarket.
files.wordpress.com/2013/06/walpole-farmers-market-guidelines-2013.pdf. 
92  Market Admin, WALPOLE FARMERS MARKET, http://walpolefarmersmarket.com/
market-admin (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
93  Market Rules, City of Parkersburg, Downtown Farmers’ Marketplace 2013 
Market Rules and Regulations 2 (2013) [hereinafter Parkersburg Market Rules], available 
at http://downtownfarmersmarketplace.com/downloads/2013-Market-Rules-and-
Regulations-Final.pdf. 
94  Id. at 3. 
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have some options for enforcement, however, as discussed in the 
following section. 
2. Inspections and Peer Monitoring 
Some farmers’ markets stop at requiring crop lists. The Hernando, 
Mississippi Farmers’ Market, for example, lists as a possible violation of 
the rules “[s]elling items not within the guidelines of the market,” but 
does not include other mechanisms for identifying violations.95 Many 
farmers’ markets, however, use inspections by a market manager or 
board as an enforcement mechanism. In Putnam, West Virginia, “[a]ll 
new [vendor] applicants will be visited by the Verification committee” to 
confirm that they are producers “of the specified items that they intend 
to sell.”96 In the same state, the Parkersburg market rules provide: “By 
submitting an application, vendors agree that the Farmers Market 
Manager or their designee may inspect the vendor’s farm or facilities to 
insure [sic] compliance.”97 In California, the North San Diego Certified 
Farmers Market (“NSDCFM”) is even more explicit in granting market 
managers permission to inspect: “Producer/seller grants permission to 
the NSDCFM manager or other NSDCFM staff to enter the seller’s 
premises for the reasonable inspection of land, facilities, product(s) and 
records in order to determine whether the seller is in compliance with 
Market regulations and permit conditions.”98 
Several Texas markets have similar provisions. The Brazos Valley 
Farmers’ Market indicates that “[m]embers are allowed to sell farm 
products that are grown and/or made by themselves,”99 and growers, in 
submitting membership applications, agree to permit farm inspections 
and to “sell only items as specified” by the market rules.100 The San 
Antonio Farmers’ Market appoints a market board member-at-large to 
chair the “Produce Verification” committee, which conducts an “initial 
land verification” and presents its “findings to [the] membership 
                                                 
95  Hernando Market Application, supra note 88. 
96  Putnam Market Rules, supra note 83, at 4. 
97  Parkersburg Market Rules, supra note 93, at 6. 
98  Market Rules, North San Diego Certified Farmers Market, 2013–2014 Market 
Rules 9 (2013) [hereinafter NSDCFM Market Rules], available at http://docs.nsdcfm.com/
MarketRules.pdf. 
99  Market Rules, Brazos Valley Farmers’ Market Association, Rules and 
Regulations 1, available at http://brazosvalleyfarmersmarket.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/01/2009-Rules-and-Regulations.pdf. 
100  Market Application, Brazos Valley Farmers’ Market Association, 2014 
Application for Membership 1 (2014), available at http://brazosvalleyfarmersmarket.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Brazos-Valley-Farmers-Market-application-form-2008-1.pdf. 
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committee.”101 And the Barton Creek Farmers Market in Austin, Texas, 
provides for farm inspections “by a professional inspector or a Market 
Manager” or “participating growers,” and farmers must be prepared for 
“surprise inspections immediately following (but not limited to) the 
market day.”102 Chicago also allows inspection without notification, and 
“[f]ailure to allow such an inspection will constitute a violation of market 
rules.”103 
Inspections, of course, are not foolproof mechanisms for 
enforcement. Produce might be simply sitting on site, not growing, thus 
failing to indicate whether it was produced in state, or the produce might 
not be the type of crop it appears to be in the field. As a Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin manager noted when she inspected a watermelon farm, “all of 
the melons were . . . in a pile under a tree,” and “[i]t was impossible to 
tell whether they had bought them and stored them there, or whether 
they had grown and harvested them.”104 Other monitors in Connecticut 
indicated that a farmer “ ‘showed us a large planting of corn and said, 
“There’s my sweet corn,” . . . . Later we learned that he showed us a field 
of cow corn.’ ”105 
Other markets explicitly rely on peer monitoring in addition to or in 
lieu of direct farm inspections. Under Walpole, New Hampshire’s market 
guidelines, “Any vendor who becomes aware of a violation of these 
guidelines is responsible to report that violation, in writing, to a 
Coordinator.”106 In some cases, at least, producers do appear to monitor 
each other—too much so, in fact. In East Granby, Connecticut, farmers 
who accuse peers of cheating must pay a fee for doing so; if they are 
correct, the fee is returned, but they forfeit the fee if the accusation is 
meritless.107 
                                                 
101  Market Rules, San Antonio Farmer’s Market Association, By-Laws 2010, at 4–5 
(2010), available at http://www.sanantoniofarmersmarket.org/S_A_Farmers_Mkt_by-
laws.pdf. 
102  Market Rules, Barton Creek Farmers Market, Rules 9 (2011) [hereinafter Barton 
Creek Market Rules], available at http://www.bartoncreekfarmersmarket.org/wp-content/
uploads/vendorrules.pdf. 
103  Market Rules, City of Chicago, 2014 Chicago Farmers and Community Market 
Program Rules & Regulations for Growers, Food Producers, and Non-Food Vendors (2014) 
[hereinafter Chicago Market Rules] available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/
city/depts/dca/Farmers%20Market/FarmersMarketRulesRegs2014.pdf. 
104  Sarah Johnson, Defining and Defending a Producer-Only Market, MARKET BEET 
(Farmers Mkt. Coal., Kimberton, Pa.), Winter 2010, at 3, 4, available at 
http://ecbiz71.inmotionhosting.com/~farmer8/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/FMC-Market-
Beet-Winter-2010_w_links.pdf. 
105  Spiegel, supra note 65. 
106  Walpole Market Rules, supra note 91, at 7. 
107  Spiegel, supra note 65. 
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3. Sanctions 
Whether producer fraud is revealed through an inspection or a peer 
complaint, sanctions appear to be similar around the country. Many 
market rules provide that sellers will be suspended for one day from the 
market if a violation is found, or for several weeks.108 If repeat violations 
occur, or a particularly egregious deviation from rules is found, the 
vendor might be suspended from the market for the season.109 Under 
“three strikes” provisions or sanctions for the worst violations, vendors 
are permanently suspended from selling at the market.110 Fines are, in 
some cases, issued for any of these violation stages, and vendors 
typically may appeal the violation to a market board designated for this 
purpose.111 The North San Diego Certified Farmers’ Market shows how 
violations depend on the frequency with which they occur or, for each 
violation, the level of egregiousness of the violation: “The severity of any 
penalty or discipline imposed by the Market Manager shall be directly 
related to the gravity or repetition of the violation.”112 Producers who for 
the first time “sell products not of their own production” are suspended 
from the market for 30 days, whereas a second violation of the producer-
only requirement “shall result in permanent disqualification from the 
market.”113 Identical language with respect to gravity and repetition of 
the violation is used in Chicago,114 and if the city’s Department of 
Cultural Affairs and Special Events “repeatedly suspects a vendor of re-
selling product, this is grounds for suspension or dismissal from market. 
It is the vendor’s responsibility to provide proof of production in a 
                                                 
108  E.g., Barton Creek Market Rules, supra note 102 (explaining the market 
manager may suspend vendors who violate the rules); Chicago Market Rules, supra note 
103 (reserving the right to refuse any vendor who does not keep the rules); Hernando 
Market Application, supra note 88 (providing that penalties range from one day suspension 
to permanent expulsion); NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10 (providing for a 
thirty day suspension for selling produce grown by others). 
109  E.g., NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10 (noting that penalties for 
violations can include suspension for up to eighteen months). 
110  See, e.g., Market Rules, Noblesville Main Street, Noblesville Farmers Market 
2014 Agreement 4–5 (2014), available at http://www.noblesvillemainstreet.org/uploads/
Farmers_Market_Agreement_2014__final2.6.14_.pdf; NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 
98, at 10. 
111  E.g., Barton Creek Market Rules, supra note 102 (explaining the market 
manager’s authority to impose fines for violations and the corresponding appeal process); 
NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 2 (explaining an appeals process). 
112  NSDCFM Market Rules, supra note 98, at 10. 
113  Id. 
114  Chicago Market Rules, supra note 103 (“The severity of any penalty or discipline 
imposed by DCASE will be directly related to the gravity or repetition of the violation.”). 
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written appeal.”115 At Crescent City Farmers’ Market in New Orleans, 
individuals tasked with enforcement provide written notification to 
vendors for the first four violations, followed by allowing the vendor to 
stay at the market on the day of the fourth strike but suspending her the 
following week, a similar action but a two-week suspension for the fifth 
strike, a month-long suspension for strike six, and permanent 
suspension beyond this.116 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Contractual Approaches 
Most farmers’ markets take on primary responsibility for setting 
rules and enforcing them, although some are more diligent than others 
in ensuring that violations will be noticed and enforced. There are 
substantial advantages to this dispersed system, which relies on those 
closest to the farmers to ensure that produce sold at markets is produced 
nearby. This system takes advantage of local knowledge—in small 
towns, market managers might happen to drive by farms even when not 
formally inspecting them. Local decision-making also allows markets to 
adapt rules, inspections, and enforcement policies to local conditions and 
needs; in states where crops can be grown in several seasons, for 
example, market managers might not need to make as many inspections 
during the year to confirm that the produce sold week-to-week is local. 
Markets in small towns without much farmer entry and exit might also 
be able to impose relatively light rules, as norms likely will prevail 
within these relatively closed communities. Farmers in these 
communities know their neighbors and will impose various shaming 
mechanisms and other informal modes of punishment if cheating occurs 
at the market. Additionally, competition for locavores will drive both 
vendors and market managers to closely monitor grower behavior. 
Despite the many advantages of relying primarily on markets to set 
their own rules and enforce them, the system has substantial downsides 
similar to those observed in a federal-state regulatory system. Markets—
particularly relatively new ones that are just establishing a presence in a 
community—might lack the resources to hire managers and other 
officials and pay them to conduct regular and thorough inspections.117 
And the number of inspections or other mechanisms needed to verify 
that produce is local will often require too much time and effort for 
                                                 
115  Id. 
116  HAMILTON, supra note 17, at 22. 
117  See KARL FOORD, UNIV. OF MINN. EXTENSION SERV., MANAGING THE FARMERS’ 
MARKET 9–10 (n.d.), available at http://mfma.le3.getliveedit.com/files/283.pdf (suggesting 
that Minnesota farmers oppose a system like California’s certification of producer’s only 
markets, as inspection fees associated with certification—$250 annually—would be viewed 
negatively). 
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volunteers. Further, as shown by the allegations that one market 
organization discouraged a manager from publicizing fraud,118 internal 
politics could prevent market managers from consistently and fairly 
enforcing rules. Managers want markets to succeed and might be 
hesitant to encourage strict policing; they might also favor certain sellers 
over others, thus leading to inconsistent and unfair enforcement. Both 
norms and more formal policies can lead to unpalatable conduct. In 
Tomah, Wisconsin, a local farmer who asked the city council to consider 
banning resellers reported that “a vendor who grows his apples but also 
resells pumpkins[] made ‘verbal threats to bash my head in while 
swinging a cane in my direction.’ ”119 
B. Regulatory 
Rather than rely on markets to police themselves, some state and 
local governments have deployed regulatory schemes to address farmers’ 
market fraud. This regulation occurs at the city, county, or state level, 
and it often mimics rules, enforcement mechanisms, and penalties 
imposed by markets, although it sometimes takes a more stringent 
approach. 
1. County and State Laws 
California appears to have one of the most aggressive farmers’ 
market regulatory programs. State laws allow county agricultural 
commissioners to issue “[a] certified farmers’ market certificate,” which 
is valid for twelve months after it is issued.120 This certificate guarantees 
that only local produce is sold at the farmers’ market, and the state 
provides various mechanisms to fund county enforcement of provisions 
that ensure localism.121 Agricultural commissioners “may charge a 
certification and inspection fee up to a maximum rate of sixty dollars 
($60) per hour.”122 Although the rules do not specify that producers at the 
markets must be certified, they have provisions for certifying individual 
producers and require markets to pay “a fee equal to the number of 
certified producer certificates and other agricultural producers 
participating on each market day.”123 For each certified producer at each 
market, the commissioner must “perform at least one annual onsite 
inspection” of the site(s) listed on each seller’s certificate “to verify 
                                                 
118  See Karp, supra note 75. 
119  Etter, supra note 52. 
120  CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 47020(a) (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
121  E.g., id. § 47020 (Westlaw) (providing that fees may be charged for inspections). 
122  Id. § 47020(a) (Westlaw). 
123  Id. § 47021(a) (Westlaw). 
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production of the commodities listed on the certificate or the existence in 
storage of the harvested production, or both.”124 Enforcing officers also 
“may seize and hold as evidence” produce if a violation is suspected,125 
and the produce may be used as evidence in actions taken by counties.126 
These inspection rules do not solve the problems experienced by 
many markets with similar inspection provisions, as they allow 
inspectors to simply verify that the product is on site, rather than 
actually growing. (This is of course acceptable for certain storable 
products, which farmers might legitimately keep on site, but it fails to 
directly verify that the products were grown on site.) The required 
inspections also do not confirm produce within each growing season. In 
addition to the substantive limitations of these annual site visits, 
California lacks adequate numbers of inspectors.127 
Sanctions under the certified program are also similar to those 
issued by markets that run their own programs in that they increase in 
severity with repetition and seriousness. The sanctions are somewhat 
more serious, however, in that they involve defined civil penalties in 
addition to suspensions. “Serious . . . repeat or intentional violations” 
receive a civil penalty between $401 and $1,000, “moderate” repeat 
violations receive $151–$400 penalties, and “minor” procedural 
violations are subject to $50–$150 penalties.128 Sellers charged with 
violating the rules are entitled to written notice and may request a 
hearing at which the sellers may present their own evidence.129 Sellers 
are also entitled to make written appeals to the Secretary of Food and 
Agriculture.130 
Connecticut has a similar state certification program through which 
the Connecticut Department of Agriculture Certifies certain markets as 
selling only locally-grown produce.131 Farmers participating in certified 
                                                 
124  Id. § 47020(b) (Westlaw). 
125  Id. § 47005.2 (Westlaw). 
126  Id. § 47005.3 (Westlaw). 
127  See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 59 (noting requests by “farmers, market 
managers[,] and consumers” for enhanced enforcement). 
128  § 47025(b) (Westlaw) (defining “serious” as “repeat or intentional violations”, 
“moderate” as “repeat violations or violations that are not intentional,” and “minor” as 
“violations that are procedural in nature”). 
129  Id. § 47025(c) (Westlaw). 
130  Id. § 47025(d) (Westlaw). 
131  See Market Agreement, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of 
Understanding (2012), available at http://www.ct.gov/doag/lib/doag/marketing_files/2012_
fm_mou_fillable.pdf (showing a memorandum of understanding form through which the 
state recognizes the market as offering Connecticut farm products “with a traceable point 
of origin within Connecticut”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-6r (Westlaw through 
2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.) (defining certified farmers’ markets). 
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markets must provide a crop plan to the Department describing total 
acres on the farm, “[t]otal [a]cres [c]ultivated,” and specific numbers of 
acres, rows per foot, greenhouse square feet, or number of trees for 
various types of produce grown.132 The head of the farmers’ market 
certification program reports that farms new to certified markets are 
inspected but that re-certifications are done only every three years, and 
typically without visits.133 “The Commissioner of Agriculture may impose 
civil penalties for” violations of the certification requirement up to a 
maximum of $2,500 for each violation.134 
Mississippi offers a voluntary certification of markets by the 
Missisissippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce.135 To qualify, at 
least half of the products at the market must be grown by the grower or 
a representative in Mississippi, and the grower or a representative must 
be present at the market.136 The state provides that it may deny a 
market’s application or revoke certification for failure to meet market 
criteria.137 The state does not, however, appear to have formal rules 
regarding inspection to verify that fifty percent of products are local or 
associated sanctions for fraud. On the market certification application, 
the state asks the market to identify “the process by which your 
growers/vendors are certified to sell at your market,” with options of 
“[o]n-site inspection,” “[t]elephone verification,” “[w]ritten confirmation,” 
and “[o]ther.”138 Certification of crop lists by agricultural extension 
agents is another fraud prevention strategy. The Hernando, Mississippi 
Farmers Market, discussed above, requires that the crop list affidavit be 
                                                 
132  CONN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BUREAU OF AGRIC. DEV. & RES. PRES., 2012–2014 CROP 
PLAN (2011), available at http://www.ct.gov/doag/lib/doag/marketing_files/2012-2014_-_
crop_plan_fillable_.pdf. 
133  Spiegel, supra note 65. 
134  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7 (Westlaw through 2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.). 
135  02-001-212 MISS. CODE R. § 100 (LEXIS through Jan. 3, 2014); Mississippi 
Certified Farmers Markets Program, MISS. DEP’T AGRIC. & COM., http://www.mdac.state.
ms.us/departments/ms_farmers_market/certified-markets.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
136  § 102 (LEXIS); see also MISS. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & COMMERCE, CERTIFIED FARMERS 
MARKET PROGRAM REGULATIONS (2013) [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI CERTIFIED FARMERS 
MARKET PROGRAM REGULATIONS], available at http://www.mdac.state.ms.us/departments/
ms_farmers_market/pdf/CFM_regs.pdf. 
137  §§ 102, 104 (LEXIS); MISSISSIPPI CERTIFIED FARMERS MARKET PROGRAM 
REGULATIONS, supra note 136. 
138  Market Application, Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce, 
Mississippi Certified Farmers Market Membership Application, available at 
http://www.mdac.state.ms.us/departments/ms_farmers_market/pdf/CFM_app.pdf. 
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signed by an agricultural extension agent, as do Washington, D.C.’s 
FRESHFARM Markets.139 
Consumer protection divisions are another potential option to 
protect locavores against market fraud. In Texas, for example, the 
Consumer Protection Division may seek a restraining order against 
“causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, 
approval, or certification of goods or services.”140 
Although a few states have taken steps toward certifying food 
localism, most leave this responsibility to the markets themselves, in 
some cases loosely regulating them as required by the federal Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Program,141 in which consumers may use food 
assistance funds to purchase local produce. 
2. Federal Laws 
The majority of responsibility for specifically defining and enforcing 
localism falls to markets, or to local and state governments, but the 
federal government initially drove the definition of “local” food and the 
means of enforcing it. The WIC Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program 
(“FMNP”)142 provides federal funds specifically for purchases of “fresh, 
nutritious, unprepared, locally grown fruits, vegetables and herbs for 
human consumption.”143 It also directs state agencies, which administer 
the program, to “consider locally grown to mean produce grown only 
within State borders,” although a state may also “include areas in 
neighboring States adjacent to its borders.”144 To enforce the “locally 
grown” mandate, the USDA requires states to create a system for 
                                                 
139  Hernando Market Application, supra note 88; FRESHFARM Market Rules, supra 
note 81, at 13. The FRESHFARM market rules also allow for another “3rd party inspector 
(i.e., USDA Organic, Food Alliance).” Id. 
140  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46–47 (Westlaw through 2013 3d Called 
Sess.). 
141  7 C.F.R. § 248.4 (2012). 
142  There is also a Senior FMNP. Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.fns.usda.gov/sfmnp (last visited Mar. 20, 2014); see also Marne 
Coit, Jumping on the Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the 
Local Food Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 45, 63–66 (2008) (discussing the Farmers’ 
Market Nutrition Program and the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program, created by 
the Child Nutrition Act of 1996 and the Farmer-to-Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 
1976, respectively); Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law & the Environment: Informational and 
Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 273 
(2011) (describing the extension of SNAP and WIC to farmers’ markets). 
143  7 C.F.R. § 248.2 (defining “[e]ligible foods”); see also § 248.1 (stating one purpose 
of the FMNP is “[t]o provide resources in the form of fresh, nutritious, unprepared foods 
(fruits and vegetables) from farmers’ markets to women, infants, and children who are 
nutritionally at risk”). 
144  § 248.2. 
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“identifying high risk farmers, farmers’ markets [if the state chooses to 
certify markets], and roadside stands and ensuring on-site monitoring, 
conducting further investigation, and sanctioning of” these businesses 
“as appropriate.”145 As part of this system, states must “conduct annual, 
on-site monitoring for at least 10 percent of farmers and 10 percent of 
farmers’ markets” that participate in the program, with the highest risk 
farmers and markets being included within this 10 percent.146 
In states that certify markets, certification of a market as WIC 
FMNP shows all consumers—not just those using federal assistance—
that the food at that market is local. To fulfill the federal requirements 
of risk ranking, inspection, and sanctions, participating states must 
write and follow state plans,147 and these plans often go beyond the 
minimum federal requirements to define and enforce localness. As 
Connecticut defines its WIC FMNP, “[t]he program shall supply 
Connecticut-grown fresh produce to participants of the special 
supplemental food program through the distribution of vouchers that are 
redeemable only at designated Connecticut farmers’ markets.”148 
Vendors at these markets must be certified by the state and as part of 
certification must agree “to maintain only Connecticut-grown fresh 
produce on display in a certified vendor stall.”149 Vendors also must 
submit “a completed application and crop plan to the department.”150 
Most penalties outlined by the state are for vendors’ failure to comply 
with requirements for properly submitting vouchers to the state. There 
are no precertification requirements for farm inspections to verify that 
produce was locally grown, but the refusal to allow an inspection when 
the point of origin is in question is a violation.151 
Massachusetts similarly provides that “[o]nly locally grown produce 
from local farms is eligible” for the FMNP, although some FMNP-
certified markets in the state are allowed to sell produce from border 
states.152 Massachusetts also conducts some farm inspections under its 
                                                 
145  Id. § 248.10(e). 
146  Id. § 248.10(e)(2). 
147  Id. § 248.4; The plans contain a number of guidelines unrelated to verifying 
localism; these include, for example, provisions for coupon reimbursement and price 
posting. Id. 
148  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-6h (Westlaw through 2013 Jan. Reg. Sess.). 
149  Id. § 22-6l (Westlaw). 
150  Id. (Westlaw). 
151  Id. § 22-6n (Westlaw). 
152  MASS. DEP’T OF AGRIC. RES., 2013 MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET COUPON 
PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR FARMERS AND FARMERS’ MARKETS 2 (2013) [hereinafter 
MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET GUIDELINES] (on file with the Regent University Law 
Review). 
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FMNP program, as do market managers.153 Growers receiving more than 
$1,000 in WIC farmers’ market coupons in a year are required to file 
acreage reports (a “crop plan”) the following year, and they may only sell 
food included on these lists.154 Through this program, the state 
suspended several farmers who sold non-local produce to FMNP 
customers and has issued warnings.155 
Other states have similar requirements. For farmers’ markets to 
participate in the New York FMNP, they must submit a market 
application showing that the market will be comprised of at least fifty 
percent “bona fide New York State farmers . . . who grow and harvest [at 
least fifty percent of their] fresh fruits and vegetables on land owned or 
leased by them and who sell directly to consumers.”156 To certify farmers, 
markets are to use crop plans “with specific farm location(s) and a list of 
the vegetables and/or fruits expected to be grown for sale at the 
market.”157 Market managers and the state also may conduct farm 
inspections to “verify Crop Plans,” and a failed inspection results in 
immediate disqualification of the farmer from the FMNP program.158 
Arizona’s FMNP agreement mandates a crop plan and that farmers at 
approved farmers’ markets must “[b]e subject to both overt and covert 
monitoring for compliance with AZ FMNP requirements,” including 
“[m]arket visits, compliance buys and inspections of food production 
areas.”159 
Florida does not certify markets as FMNP-approved, but rather 
identifies markets with participating farmers160 and certifies individual 
                                                 
153  Id. (“ALL certified farmers must agree to allow on-farm inspections by MDAR to 
verify product sources and acreage under production.”); E-mail from David Webber, 
Farmers’ Mkt. Program Coordinator, Mass. Exec. Office of Energy & Envtl. Affairs, to 
author, (Nov. 21, 2013, 15:29 EST) (on file with the Regent University Law Review) 
(explaining that market managers also conduct inspections). 
154   MASSACHUSETTS FARMERS’ MARKET GUIDELINES, supra note 152, at 2; Webber, 
supra note 153. 
155  Webber, supra note 153. 
156  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF AGRIC. & MKTS., PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FARMERS’ MARKETS (2013), available at http://www.agriculture.ny.gov/AP/agservices/fmnp/
FMNP_Farmers_Market_Package.pdf. 
157  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
158  Id. at 4. 
159  ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., MANUAL FOR GROWERS AND FARMERS’ MARKET 
MANAGERS 20 (2014), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/azwic/documents/local_agencies/
az-fmnp-growers-manual.pdf. 
160  See Attachment E, FMNP Market Locations and WIC Sites Maps and 
Proximities, provided by Carl Penn, Development Representative II, Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & 
Consumer Servs. (Jan. 23, 2014) (on file with the Regent University Law Review). 
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:367 392 
farmers161 to sell to FMNP coupon customers at markets around the 
state. Under the state’s FMNP plan, state officials must “[c]onduct 
compliance buys” to verify that farmers are selling only “eligible 
products (i.e., locally grown Florida fresh fruits and vegetables)” to 
FMNP customers.162 Farmers must also “allow on-farm visits by the local 
county extensive agents to verify product sources and acreage under 
production.”163 
Although the WIC FMNP certification is a somewhat indirect 
means to certifying compliance, as it only applies to certain participating 
markets and farmers and contains many standards unrelated to 
certifying localness, it shows that federal regulations for local food could 
be implemented if there was sufficient demand for them. Just as the 
USDA produced a regulatory definition of organic food and established a 
certification program,164 the USDA could extend its FMNP definition of 
local foods, or create a new one, and administer a local certification 
program directly or through the states. As discussed in the following 
section, generally-applicable consumer protection laws are another 
avenue for addressing farmers’ market fraud, albeit one that does not 
appear to be widely used. 
3. Advantages and Barriers to Regulatory Enforcement 
In some cases, producers are so concerned about fraud that they 
have demanded more regulation or certification. Some, for example, have 
requested that “a sting operation be conducted in order to ‘bust those 
liars and cheats,’ ”165 which, according to at least one study, “is consistent 
with the feeling reported by many vendors that specific regulations 
should prevent . . . re-sellers from participating in markets.”166 Moving 
the responsibility for ensuring localism from individual markets to a 
local, state, or federal regulatory body would centralize expertise that is 
currently dispersed. It would also provide a forum through which 
consumers, farmers, and market managers could focus on and agree 
                                                 
161  See FLA. DEP’T AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., GROWER’S HANDBOOK 2 (2012) 
[hereinafter GROWER’S HANDBOOK] (on file with the Regent University Law Review) 
(describing farmer certification “by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer 
Services to participate in the program”). 
162  State of Florida Farmers Market Nutrition Program, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. and the Fla. Dep’t of 
Health 3 (Oct. 31, 2013) (on file with the Regent University Law Review). 
163  GROWER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 161, at 2. 
164  7 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to establish national 
standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically 
produced products . . . .”); see generally §§ 6501–23. 
165  Miller et al., supra note 72, at 130–31. 
166  Id. at 131. 
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upon standards that would better ensure that local food was in fact local. 
Further, it would provide economies of scale in administering standards; 
inspections and enforcement are not likely to be a full-time job in all but 
the biggest markets, and it would be more efficient for well-trained 
inspectors to operate in more areas. As these inspectors gained 
experience through incidents at a variety of farms and markets, they 
would also better know which problems to look for, and the times and 
types of inspections that were most effective. 
There are, however, substantial obstacles to a regulatory proposal. 
As with any effort to protect the values of a large and dispersed group of 
stakeholders, it will be difficult to expand the regulatory state to address 
fraudulent sales of local produce. In California, following the NBC 
investigation that revealed relatively egregious fraud, a bill was 
introduced to increase market operator fees in order to pay for better 
inspections.167 The bill died in committee because “[a]ccording to 
legislative insiders, the bill’s great many provisions and complex 
language, including new penalties and mandates, did not work in its 
favor.”168 
Even if expanded regulatory oversight of localism were feasible, it is 
not in all cases advisable. Market managers and farmers likely have the 
most knowledge about the type of fraud that occurs and how to best 
address it given the culture and norms within particular communities, 
and uniform regulation threatens to drown these nuances. In many 
cases, regulation therefore will not be needed: consumer discernment 
and competition among markets to prove “localness” will often be 
enough. Particularly where markets are small, farmers can police 
themselves; indeed, they might not be able to afford anything else.169 
Relying on self-policing, however, sometimes leads to friction170 that is 
                                                 
167  David Karp, Bill Targeting Cheaters at Farmers Markets is Put Off Another Year, 
L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/features/food/dailydish/la-dd-bill-
cheaters-farmers-markets-20130524,0,2483274.story. 
168  Id. 
169  See GARRY STEPHENSON ET AL., WHEN THINGS DON’T WORK: SOME INSIGHTS INTO 
WHY FARMERS’ MARKETS CLOSE 9 (2006), available at http://smallfarms.oregonstate.edu/
sites/default/files/small-farms-tech-report/eesc_1073.pdf (noting “situations in which a high 
level of effort is required to manage a market but the market administrative revenue is 
insufficient for adequate salary” for a manager, and that this can occur for small markets). 
170  RAMU GOVINDASAMY ET AL., FARMERS MARKETS: MANAGERS CHARACTERISTICS 
AND FACTORS AFFECTING MARKET ORGANIZATION, at v, 8 (1998), available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/36723/2/pa980898.pdf (noting that “rivalry among 
vendors” sometimes “threatens to hinder the continuity and efficiency of these marketing 
venues” and “that open hostility, negative remarks, false accusations about the origin of 
the produce and problems with respect to the acceptance of food stamps or WIC vouchers 
put a strain on the normal development of the markets’ activities”). 
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best solved by a more formal and predictable regulatory regime.171 As 
one market manager notes, as markets get larger, enforcement becomes 
more important: “You can’t be everywhere and you don’t know what’s 
happening at that other end of the market now. You have to trust more, 
have more structure, and have systems for enforcement of rules.”172 But 
this is not to say that these rules must be imposed through regulation, 
rather than by the markets themselves. With adequate competition for 
localness, market managers will write and enforce rules themselves—as 
they currently do: “A lot of regulation is put on managers” in modern 
large markets.173 
C. Criminal 
In addition to expanding the administrative state to localism, 
governments could, and sometimes do, criminally punish farmers’ 
market fraud. This approach, with its threat of more severe sanctions, 
would likely deter more individuals from defrauding customers given the 
same odds of detection. This section explores this somewhat extreme 
approach to addressing the problem of dishonest produce sales. 
1. Extension of Existing Laws to Market Fraud 
Many state consumer protection laws cover agricultural fraud. 
Virginia’s code provision labeled “Misrepresentation as to agricultural 
products” provides that “[m]isrepresentation by advertising in the press 
or by radio or by television, or misrepresentation by letter, statement, 
mark representing grade, quality or condition, label or otherwise in 
handling, selling, offering or exposing for sale any agricultural 
commodities is hereby prohibited.”174 In Texas, “[a] person commits an 
offense if in the course of business he intentionally, knowingly, [or] 
recklessly” sells “an adulterated or mislabeled commodity.”175 
In states like California, where incidents of market fraud have been 
highly publicized (and criticized), governments are beginning to use 
criminal laws to enforce localism—in conjunction with regulatory 
schemes.176 As introduced in Part II, after undercover state agents 
noticed that a seller was selling produce he did not grow and that 
                                                 
171  FOORD, supra note 117, at 9 (noting that certification “eliminates a potential 
friction point among vendors, who might suspect other vendors of selling products they 
have purchased rather than products that they have produced”). 
172  STEPHENSON ET AL., supra note 76, at 13. 
173  Id. at 12. 
174  VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-225 (LEXIS through 2013 Spec. Sess. I). 
175  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.42 (Westlaw through 2013 3d Called Sess.). 
176  David Karp, Produce Inspectors Keep Farmers Markets Honest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
26, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-farmers-market-20131227,0,2801845.story. 
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contained pesticides, the city attorney of San Diego charged the seller for 
a violation of a section of the state’s Business and Professions Code.177 
The Code provides that it is unlawful for persons disposing of real or 
personal property to “disseminate” information that “is untrue or 
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable 
care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.”178 The defendant 
received three years’ probation and “was ordered to violate no law; not to 
sell or offer for sale produce at certified farmers markets in San Diego 
County; and to pay a $1,000 fine.”179 
2. Advantages and Barriers to Criminal Enforcement 
Criminally punishing a farmer for selling produce he did not grow 
may seem an extreme approach to market fraud, but it is a relatively 
cheap one from the perspective of the state. An enforcement apparatus 
already exists for crime, and police would simply have to investigate a 
few additional incidents. And as shown by the California guilty plea, the 
sanctions for criminal approaches to market fraud can involve penalties 
higher than those imposed by a regulatory scheme, including jail time. 
Prison terms for consumer fraud tend to be light, but states that were 
serious about addressing market fraud could increase jail time. Criminal 
penalties also generally create more stigma than their civil counterparts, 
thus punishing past behavior by shaming individuals for bad acts and 
further deterring future fraud by the stigmatized individuals. 
A criminal approach, despite being cheap from an administrative 
perspective and deterring greater amounts of fraud for the same amount 
of enforcement, has disadvantages. Police are unlikely to prioritize food 
fraud in all but the biggest cases or the safest towns. Prosecutors and 
judges also may view criminal penalties for this type of fraud as 
unusually harsh and will be hesitant to charge defendants, particularly 
in light of other prosecutorial priorities. Criminal sanctions would likely 
be quite effective at improving seller honesty if uniformly implemented 
and strictly enforced, but relating to harshness, and the many other 
problems that already burden the criminal justice system, make it a less 
than perfect solution to farmers’ market fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
As farmers’ markets become more lucrative, fraud may become a 
larger problem. Maintaining consumer confidence is critical, and the 
                                                 
177  Supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
178  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.); supra note 
64 and accompanying text (describing the charge and the guilty plea). 
179  Turner, supra note 64. 
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honest farmers have the most to lose—one bad apple can spoil the whole 
bunch. 
For small markets and towns where farmers and consumers know 
each other (and who is growing what), informal mechanisms may be 
sufficient. For big markets and cities, if enough consumers are able to 
discern the difference between local and fraudulent produce, markets 
may be well advised to adopt more rigorous enforcement measures—and 
to advertise it when they do. In the long run, if consumers demand 
greater assurance that they are getting what they pay for, the market(s) 
should respond. On the other hand, if there is insufficient competition 
among local food outlets, or consumers are not able to adequately 
distinguish between local and non-local foods, more government 
intervention may be necessary. If so, direct government enforcement is 
likely to be limited, but requiring more rigorous self-regulation in 
certification processes may be a possibility. Given that most jurisdictions 
are probably unlikely to create an adequate regulatory enforcement 
regime, the markets themselves may be the best bet, with criminal 
enforcement of chronic or widespread fraud. Requiring, perhaps, 
unannounced farm visits, documentation of plantings and sales, and 
ensuring adequate oversight of market supervisors would be a logical 
place to start, and, as outlined above, the framework for such a 
requirement already exists. But perhaps the most effective step would be 
educating consumers: In the long run, if consumers learn to demand 
greater assurance that their local avocado is what it says it is, fraud will 
be less profitable. 
